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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
THE

RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE NAME, REPUTATION AND
PERSONALITY OF A DECEASED RELATIVE

The twentieth century has witnessed the development of the individual's interest
in privacy from a mere plea in a law review article to its present position as a wellrecognized legal right, infringement of which results in tort liability. The right to
privacy, or the right to be let alone, was first espoused in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis.' In one of the first tests of the theory, the New York Court
of Appeals rejected it.2 This ruling, however, was later reversed by statute.3 The
first court to adopt the theory was the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1905.'
Since then the tort has prospered; thirty-one jurisdictions have recognized the right.'
Four additional states have recognized it to a limited degree by statute.6
The question examined in this article is whether or not any right to privacy
exists in the name, reputation, and life history of a deceased which can be exercised
by his legal representative or next of kin. While a person is alive he is protected
against certain invasions of his private life by this right to privacy. Does the
fact that he is now dead allow opportunists to commit these invasions which, but
for the victim's demise, would be actionable?
In the recent case of Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc. 7 the administratrix

of the estate of the late Al Capone and his wife and son sued the producers, the
sponsor and the broadcasting company which telecast several programs supposedly based on the life of the deceased. 8 The estate claimed a property right in the
name, likeness, and personality of the deceased, 9 while the wife and son claimed an
1 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Huv.L. Rxv. 193 (1890).
2 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). A picture
of the plaintiff, apparently an attractive young lady, was used without her consent by the defendant company to advertise its product.
3 N. Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAw §§ 50-52.
4 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
5 PaOSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 831-32 (3d ed. 1964). Dean Prosser lists the following jurisdictions as having adopted the right to privacy: Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305,
(D.D.C. 1948); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948); Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska
416 (1928); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Olan Mills
of Texas v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,
297 P. 91 (1931); Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Sup. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (1959); Barbieri v.
News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963); CJason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243
(1944); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., 347 Ill.
App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119
Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 247 Iowa 817,
76 N.W.2d 762 (1956); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941); Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co., 82 So. 2d 61 (La. Ct. App. 1955); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962);
Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948); Martin v. Dorton,
210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291
(1942) ; Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) ; Norman v. City of Las Vegas,
64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947); Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J.Eq. 481, 58 A.2d 86 (Ch. 1948);
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio
St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438
(1941); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of
Va., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940) ; Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D.
1963); Langford v. Vanderbilt University, 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32 (1956); Roach v.
Harper, 143 W.Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
6 N. Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839 (1958); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-4-8 (1953), § 76-4-9 (Supp. 1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1950).
7 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
8 The original telecast was a two-part drama broadcast in 1959, based on the book, "The
Untouchables," by Eliot Ness (1957). Subsequently, the Desilu Company produced a series of
weekly television broadcasts, called "The Untouchables" which often used the name and character of the deceased. The plaintiffs contended that the facts portrayed in these telecasts were
largely fictitious.
9 The theory of this claim is discussed in Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness,
Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 553 (1960). Mr. Gordon was the attorney for the
plaintiffs in Maritote.
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invasion of their right of privacy even though they were not mentioned in the telecasts. The court rejected the estate's property right theory and viewed both claims
as being for an invasion of privacy. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the federal court, stating that it was relying on Illinois law, held that the right of
privacy is a personal right which dies with an individual and cannot be claimed by
his estate. Likewise, the relatives of the deceased must prove an invasion of their
own privacy before they can recover. After reaching this decision Judge Marovitz
stated in the last two paragraphs of the opinion ° that he agreed with the plaintiff
that a wrong had been committed, and that there ought to be a remedy. However,
as a federal judge he was bound by state law, and the arguments would be better
raised in the state courts. He concluded by urging a reform of the law.
An initial distinction must be made between an invasion of privacy which takes
place during life and one which takes place after death. In the case of the former,
survival of the cause of action will depend upon the applicable survival statute in
the jurisdiction.' The latter is the problem we are concerned with here: the right
sought to be enforced is not a right of the deceased but rather it is actually the right
of the living relatives of the deceased. It is an accepted principle that the right to
privacy is a personal right which dies with an individual. 2 That is, the deceased
person suffers no wrong from an act which would have been an invasion of his
privacy had he been living. Thus the relatives are enforcing their own right to privacy which has been invaded by unwarranted publications or disclosures concerning
a deceased relative. The failure of some courts to recognize this distinction has led
to much of the confusion in this area.'s
The plaintiff, who is a relative of the deceased, need only show an invasion of
his own privacy. Usually there has been no publication of the facts of the relative's
life, not even a mention of his name. In what sense, then, has the relative's privacy
been invaded? The answer lies in the intimacy of the relation which should give
the relative a protectible interest in the name, personality and reputation of the
deceased. The intimacy is such that postmortem abuses of name, personality, and
reputation necessarily harm surviving relatives. Dean Green' 4 has strongly advocated recognition of these relational interests:
Personalities live long after their bodies die. The relation between living
and deceased relatives is no mere matter of sentiment to be brushed aside as
valueless. It is as real as between living members of a family. And once it
is recognized that the family relation continues after death, and that in the
relation is found one of the dearest and most valued interests known to
human beings, there should be no difficulty either in reaching
or articulating
acceptable judgments where such interests are involved.' 5

One of the early cases in the history of the right to privacy dealt with this prob-

10 Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
11 Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945). The defendant died and the plaintiff sought to substitute his administratrix. The court held that the
invasion was an injury to the person equal to physical injury and under the survival statute the
cause of action could survive the defendant's death.
12 Judge Marovitz cited Ravallette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962), for this principle in the Maritote case.
13 See Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962). This was a tax case in
which the plaintiff attempted to exclude from gross income an amount of money received from
Loews, Inc., for the right to do a story about the plaintiff's father. The plaintiff was relying
on the theory that he would have suffered personal injuries if the story had been done without
his consent, and this amount of money therefore represented a sum of money received on the
settlement of a claim for damages. The Court in refusing this exclusion relied on the principle
that the right to privacy is a personal right which dies with an individual. The plaintiff, therefore, would have had no cause of action which could have been pursued or settled. The Court
failed to distinguish between the father's right to privacy which died with him and the son's
relational right which belonged to him as a surviving relative.
14 Green, RelationalInterests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 (1934).
15 Id. at 485-86.
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lem. In Schuyler v. Curtis6 the defendants were collecting money for the erection of
a statue of the plaintiff's aunt, acclaiming her as the typical woman philanthropist.
Nothing derogatory was intended by their actions for they planned to honor her as
a great woman in history. The plaintiff, who was the deceased's nearest living relative, brought suit to enjoin any activities in furtherance of this plan. He alleged an
invasion of privacy in that the family's consent had not been secured, and in that
they were dismayed because such activities would have dismayed the deceased. In
reversing the injunction issued by the lower Court, the Court held that any right
of the deceased died with her and did not descend to her legal representative or
next of kin. Relief could not be granted on a complaint that the proposed statue
would have disturbed the deceased were she living. The Court examined the relational right to privacy in the surviving relatives and found that the facts here were not
sufficient to constitute an invasion of their privacy. The Court discussed at length
the merits of defendants' project, and reasoned that the plaintiff could not be caused
mental distress by defendants' attempt to honor the decedent.
It is important to note that the Court did not deny that there could be a relational right in the surviving relatives. In fact it stressed the right of the living to
protection from improper interference with the character or memory of a deceased
relative resulting in mental distress.17 The Court concluded by saying: "[O]ur decision furnishes, as we think, not the slightest occasion for the belief that under it the
feelings of relatives or friends may be outraged, or the memory of a deceased person
degraded, with impunity, by any person ...."18 The Court was clearly of the opinion that relief could be granted if the relatives could show grounds sufficient to
indicate a degrading of the deceased's memory, such as an improper use of the
statue.
Several cases have allowed recovery to the surviving relatives of a deceased
person upon a showing of an invasion of privacy. There have been two cases dealing with the photographing of deformed children. In Douglas v. Stokes"9 plaintiffs'
Siamese twins died shortly after birth. The defendant was hired by the parents to
take only twelve pictures of their bodies. Instead the defendant produced additional
copies upon which he obtained a copyright. The parents sued on the grounds of
humiliation and hurt feelings. Recovery was allowed for violation of the agreement.
However, the Court did not limit itself to this but went on to discuss the parental
affection for the children, and said that since recovery could be allowed parents for
indignities done to the bodies of the children, so also would it be allowed for these
incorporeal injustices. The same Kentucky Court in 1927, discussing another right
to privacy case,20 said Douglas could be put on no other grounds than the unwarranted invasion of privacy. Douglas has often been distinguished because of the
violation of the agreement involved, however, this would appear to be a niggardly
interpretation in view of the Kentucky Court's broader construction of its own
holding.
In Basemore v. Savannah Hospital2' a hospital allowed a photographer to take
pictures of the dead body of a deformed child and the parents were allowed to
recover for an invasion of their privacy. The Court also analogized from the dead
body cases and held that the right here was one belonging to the parents and not
surviving to them from the deceased child. This case is thought to be weak authority because it involved a violation of a confidential relationship. 2 Nevertheless, the
16 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895). Based on the findings in the case the dissenting judge
felt there was an unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff's right to the preservation of the name
and memory of the deceased.
17 Id at 25.
18 Id. at 27.
19 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
20 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
21 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930). The dissenting judge felt that the right belonged to
the child, not to the parents, and died with him.
22 Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
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case stands for the principle that there can be an invasion of privacy though the actionable transgression is visited upon the person or body of a decedent.
In both of these cases the Courts rely on the relational interest that the parents
have in the bodies and memories of their children. Their interest in preserving this
memory was protected from the unnecessary notoriety and humiliation which would
follow the publication of these pictures. It was their right to privacy that was protected, not the right of the decedent.
Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n23 involved an undertaker who used in
his advertisements pictures taken of a particular funeral. The advertisement was intended to stress the extra service provided by the mortuary in transporting the
decedent by plane from the place of death to the place of burial. The widow who
had asked for no undue notoriety concerning the funeral, sued for mental distress
upon the publication of the advertisements and recovered damages. Here again
the case is attacked as being based on the violation of an implied condition in an
oral contract. This criticism misses the significance of the developing law. To be
sure, the court will seek other grounds for liability in order to buttress the case for
consequential damages to relatives. Still no one can really believe that a tenuous
breach of a nonexistent contractual condition supplies the justification for generous
money damages. Rather the law in its time-honored fashion is using old bottles to
market the new wine of the right to privacy. This is evident when one considers
that the foreseeability test of damages applied in these so-called contract cases is
really the tort test of foreseeability. Thus recovery is allowed to those within the
foreseeable risk of harm and is not limited to the expectable contract breaches.
Two principles afford a defense to an action for invasion of privacy, and where
these defenses are present, no cause of action would exist even if the deceased himself were alive to bring it. First, where an event is of newsworthy interest, the press
is privileged to report it under the freedom of press guaranteed by the first amendment. Second, when a person becomes a public figure, he relinquishes a certain
amount of his right to privacy.
Unfortunately, many of the cases dealing with the relative's right to privacy
also involve these principles. Where a publication is in the public interest in that it
is a newsworthy item or because it involves a public figure, the courts must deny
relief just as if the case were brought by the deceased. Many of these cases have
been brought by the parents of children whose violent deaths were subsequently
reported in newspapers and magazines.2 4 Decisions for the defendant are a sad
comment on a society whose sadistic nature deems these articles noteworthy.2 Also
where the deceased has by his own actions made himself a public figure, relief will
be denied because he has thereby surrendered a portion of his right to privacy, and
the public has an interest in knowing the facts. 6
23

91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932).

24 E.g., Mahoffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F.Supp. 251 (W.D. La. 1962)
(magazine article on murder of plaintiff's son); Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So. 2d
235 (1955) (picture of deceased son with bullet protruding from his head); Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956) (publication and sale of pictures of plaintiff's
murdered daughter when her body was dragged from a river); Bradley v. Cowles Magazine
Co 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960) (magazine article on murder of the plaintifs
son); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762 (1956) (pictures of murdered son's body when found); Kelly v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98
N.E.2d 286 (195 1) (picture of daughter killed in automobile accident published in newspaper).
However, in Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959), the Court reversed a summary
judgment for defendant where there had not been an affirmative showing that the exhibition
was in the public interest.
25 See Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762 (1956).
26 Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948). The "deceased" had disappeared
years before and another man had been tried for his murder. "Deceased" later appeared in
California. The Court held that by this he had made himself a public figure, and the public
had an interest in hearing about him. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304,
95 P.2d 491 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939). The Court felt that the deceased by jumping off a building
had made herself a public figure.
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In each of these public interest cases (as distinguished from the relational suit
where no newsworthy event has occurred) the determinative feature has been the
legitimate interest of the community in the facts of a public incident, even though
attention must be focused on an otherwise obscure individual, and a sense of humiliation and mental distress brought to bear upon the surviving relatives of such an
individual. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner27 presented this problem. The defendant newspaper published a story and picture concerning a woman's suicide leap
from a building. The deceased's husband sued for an invasion of his "relational
right" of privacy. Recovery was denied on this ground because the deceased's suicide was a matter of public record not subject to any rights of privacy. The Court
here was motivated by the public nature of the act and did not otherwise rule on
the existence or nonexistence of "relational rights."
Two California cases28 dealing with the question of whether or not a relational
right to privacy might exist in the relatives of a deceased held that there was no such
right. Neither case involved the element of legitimate public interest in the newsworthiness of a story. One case was a suit brought by a widow for the wrongful
portrayal of her husband (a son of Jesse James, famed bad-man of the Old West)
in a movie. 29 The other case involved a publication of allegedly untrue statements
concerning the death of Jack Thompson, a one-time prizefighter, in a magazine
article on boxers.30 The action was brought by his sisters. Recovery was denied in
both cases. The courts refused to extend the right to privacy to third parties because to do so would open it up to all of a deceased's relatives. Both cases relied on
the California case of Coverstone v. Davies,31 which in turn cited the previously
discussed Metter 32 case for its authority. In Coverstone the parents of a boy sued for
an invasion of their privacy based on the publicity attendant upon the arrest and
trial of their son. This was clearly a public interest case, just as Metter was. Coverstone was factually distinguishable from the succeeding two cases on the element
of public interest in a matter of public record. The Coverstone court said that no
cases had been shown wherein this relational right had been recognized. Moreover,
reason and authority did not support an extension of the right because this would
open it to all relations of the deceased.33 Dean Green has criticized this kind of
reasoning3 4 and one suspects that the fears of the California Court are exaggerated.
Conclusion
No strong case has been made for or against the recognition of this relational
right. The cases which have denied a remedy have usually involved other elements
which would have defeated the recovery anyway. Likewise, the cases cited in favor
of a right of action have also involved other elements upon which to allow recovery.
At least it can be said that the reforms suggested by Dean Green and Judge Marovitz have not been rejected by the courts thus far after consideration of the precise
question. The wrongful exploitation of a person's name, reputation and personality
27
28
Kelly
29
30

1958).

35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
James v. Screen Gems, Inc., supra note 28.
Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (Dist. Ct. App.

31 38 Cal. App. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952).
32 Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939); see text
accompanying note 27 supra.
33 Another rather interesting case was that of Schumann v. Loews, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361
Sup. Ct. 1954) in which the plaintiff brought allegations of invasion of privacy in over 60
jurisdictions including the United States and several foreign countries. The defendant had
produced a movie which depicted the plaintiff's great-grandfather as being insane. The Court,
finding no precedent for recovery either in New York or in a sister state, refused the relief
sought. The cases cited by plaintiffs either did not involve dead persons or great-grandchildren.
34 Green, supra note 14.
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should not be permitted just because that person is dead. To do so might often
result in real injury to the deceased's surviving relatives, injury from which the law
could protect them. Denial of this protection because the law cannot protect against
all injuries seems an inffectual, indeed a timid, response to the commercial profiteering at the expense of helpless relatives.
If these relational rights are to be recognized, certain restrictions and limitations
would have to be placed upon them. The right should be permitted only when the
relative is deceased, for during his lifetime he himself can protect his privacy. Moreover, the relatives to whom this right should be extended would also have to be
restricted. Limiting it to the immediate family relationships of parents, spouse, children and brothers and sisters does not seem too broad an extension.
Recognition of this relational right would protect against crass invasions of
privacy which are becoming frequent in these days when radio, television, motion
pictures, newspapers and magazines intrude so much into our lives. Whether the
right is to be recognized deserves full and fair consideration on its own merits viewed
as a separate cause of action sounding in tort and not ancillary to any other remedy.
Robert P. Kennedy

